Keeping It Safe
by Robert Tutterow
Remove The Nut At The Wheel And Arrive Alive
It has often been stated that the most important component of a vehicle is the nut behind the wheel. And while there are plenty of vehicles on the road with the aforementioned nut, the fire service should be an exception.
Career or volunteer, we should always have a professional behind the wheel. Without a properly specified, maintained and trained driver/operator, a fire apparatus is subject to failure. This type failure is increasingly becoming unacceptable. A case study is in order.
Under direction from Chief Tom Carr, the Montgomery (Md.) County Fire and Rescue Services decided it was no longer business as usual with regard to apparatus and driver safety. Chief Carr’s department had been involved in a large number of collisions in recent years. Too many of the collisions were serious. The department had not ignored apparatus and driver operator safety. In fact, it had a pro-active driver-training program with a strong emphasis on safe driving. Obviously, this was not enough.
Safe Driving Action Plan
In August of 2004, Chief Carr issued a 25-point Safe Driving Action Plan. One of the points was to host a national symposium on apparatus and driver/operator safety. This past October the department held its symposium titled “Arrive Alive.” The two-day event consisted of morning general sessions and afternoon breakout sessions. Topics included driver training, collision investigations, crew resource management, driver supervision and accountability, departmental policies and procedures and testimonials.
Removing SCBA From Cabs
The keynote speaker for both general sessions was Lt. Mike Wilbur of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY).
Lt. Wilbur has as much documentation on apparatus collisions as anyone. His passionate presentations carried a common theme of seat belt usage.
To back up his theme, he rationalized the logic in removing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) from apparatus cabs. Though considered unacceptable by most departments, he pointed out that the process of buckling a seat belt while donning a SCBA usually results in the seat belt not being fastened.
He asked the participants to consider the positive aspects of waiting until arrival at the scene to don SCBA. He pointed out that donning time at the scene can also be size up (crew resource) time. That is, while the SCBAs are being donned, the crew can assess the situation, identify risks, determine escape routes, communicate among themselves and then initiate the attack. This is contrary to the “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead” approach.
Removing the SCBA from cabs also “sanitizes” the cab by reducing clutter and, by default, makes the cab safer. Without SCBAs, apparatus manufacturers can install more comfortable seats and seat belt restraint systems that are far less complicated.
A few departments, such as Los Angeles City, Phoenix and Plano, Texas, have already placed their SCBAs in compartments and have found no negative impact on their service delivery.
Wilbur acknowledged that requiring removal of SCBAs from cabs is not a viable option in today’s culture. To that end, he is working diligently through the appropriate fire service organizations to improve apparatus seating and seat belt accessibility.
A key focus area of this endeavor is a study to get better data on the size of firefighters. Believe it or not, there has never been scientific study of the dimensions and weights of firefighters wearing PPE.
An Agressive Driver
One of the more compelling stories from the “Arrive Alive” conference was a case study of a driver/operator from the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service who admitted he was an aggressive driver. However, he had never admitted this until he overturned Tower 8 while making a turn onto another street responding to a call.
His career had paralleled that of many firefighters. He had started as a volunteer cadet while still in high school. He always wanted to be on the hose line and never thought much about driving until he became an emergency medical technician (EMT) and had to start driving an ambulance. He had remembered a driver from his earlier days of firefighting who always pushed the apparatus to its limits while responding. This “role model” had unknowingly made quite the impression.
Soon, he became an engine driver and eventually qualified to drive the tower. His first accident was very minor, but quite embarrassing. He backed an ambulance into a tower ladder without using available spotters. His second accident was also with an ambulance – he knocked the mirror off trying to squeeze between two cars. He was hoping to beat the engine company to the call.
Reprimand Not Effective
Some time after this, he was reprimanded for driving his engine too fast. The reprimand did not have a lasting effect as his fast driving caused 1,200 feet of large diameter hose to accidentally deploy while responding to a multi-alarm fire.
Again, he had an “episode” while driving an ambulance. He was pulled over by local law enforcement for speeding and weaving in and out of traffic. He was returning from a call.
This was followed by “bottoming out the engine while jumping a curb to reposition the engine company at a fire scene. He was cutting a corner to beat the next arriving company.
His next incident involved an ambulance; he tore the side entrance step off when he rode up on a curb to get around other traffic.
Overturning Tower 8
Yet another event involved an ambulance. While staged at a local fair, his unit received a call. Excited to make a hasty exit with lights and siren in front of a large audience, he promptly backed into a parked car. An available spotter was not used.
All of these incidents, taken individually, were minor in nature – no injuries and no major property damage.
Finally, his defining moment occurred when he overturned Tower 8. He admitted he “cried like a baby” once he was able to exit the vehicle and determine no one was injured – though he initially thought one of firefighters in the back of the cab had been killed.
Although everyone on board was alive, they had failed to arrive. Sadly, his driving behavior had been greatly influenced by the culture of his co-workers.
The 25-point directive by Chief Carr was developed with considerable input from the members of his department. Therefore, “buy-in” was much easier.
‘Stop Driving Authority’
Noteworthy parts of the 25-point program include the use by company officers of “Stop Driving Authority,” which gives an officer the power to immediately remove any driver operating in an unsafe manner, which can include use of seat belts. Yes, you understood it correctly. If necessary, the officer can stop the vehicle during a response and ask another unit to pick up the call. Unsafe behaviors which could lead to stopping the apparatus are listed in the directive. The department has zero tolerance for seat belt violations.
Carr’s directive also calls for the department to determine designated drivers and one back-up driver for each vehicle. The directive establishes an approved driver list. Further, the directive establishes a responding routine for second, third, and more units once the first arriving unit has made an incident assessment and determined a “hot” response is not needed for the balance of the incident assignment.
The directive started a regional public awareness campaign – “See me, Hear me, Clear for me.”
Also, a designated group of chief officers was selected to make random unannounced station visits to determine apparatus readiness and address driving issues.
And, finally, other directives called for improved safe driving incentives where drivers were disciplined for poor behavior and good, expected behavior was rewarded.
Montgomery County also included the concept of Crew Resource Management in driver training and an initiative to push apparatus manufacturers to be responsive to the safety needs of the fire service – and leverage this demand at the national level.
Chief Carr and the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service have set an example we all should follow. They have the results to prove it. Yet, as Lt. Wilbur said, far too many departments still have their head in the sand.
Does your department have a nut behind the wheel?
Think about it, and then do what it takes to arrive alive!
Editor’s Note: Robert Tutterow, who has 30 years in the fire service, is the Charlotte (N.C.) Fire Department health and safety officer. He is the chair of the NFPA Fire Department Apparatus Committee’s Safety Task Force Group and is on two other NFPA committees, the Structural and Proximity Firefighting Protective Ensemble Technical Committee and the Technical Correlating Committee for Fire and Emergency Services PPE.